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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Scott Arthur Worthington appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony DUI 
with a persistent violator enhancement. Mr. Worthington pleaded guilty, but preserved 
the right to appeal from the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss based on 
I.C. § 18-915A. He asserts that the State failed to demonstrate reasonable suspicion to 
stop his vehicle. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The following facts are taken from the preliminary hearing. Steve Otto with the 
Idaho State Police testified that on August 3, 2010 at around 7:00 pm, he was with his 
family at a Jerome parade. (Prelim Tr., p.6, Ls.8-18.) The parade had just finished, and 
he walked across the street to the Shell gas station to pick some items before heading 
to the fair. (Prelim Tr., p.6, Ls.19-22.) While at the gas station, his wife pointed out an 
individual that had been mumbling and walking toward her who she said had a six pack 
of beer in his hand. (Prelim Tr., p.7, L.17 - p.8, L.4.) 
Officer Otto approached the individual, who stated that an open container in his 
vehicle was the only thing he had to drink that night. (Prelim. Tr., p.9, Ls.1-10.) The 
officer told the individual, Mr. Worthington, that he had two choices: Officer Otto could 
call his "buddies" over to deal with the situation legally, or Mr. Worthington could pour 
out his beer. (Prelim. Tr., p.9, Ls.18-24.) Mr. Worthington opted to pour his beer out. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.9, Ls.23-24.) 
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Upon speaking to Mr. Worthington, the officer noticed "a very strong odor of 
alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle. His eyes were very very bloodshot and 
glassy. This speech was very slow and slurred. His reactions were very sluggish, as 
well. He wasn't - he wasn't moving very smoothly, so to speak." (Prelim. Tr., p.10, 
Ls.1-8.) 
According to the officer, Mr. Worthington then stepped out of his vehicle, "and I 
pulled him back behind - kind of canted off his vehicle into the parking lot where there's 
no obstructions." (Prelim. Tr., p.10, Ls.9-15.) The officer began to initiate field sobriety 
tests and informed Mr. Worthington he could leave if he passed the tests. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.10, Ls.16-21.) After Mr. Worthington failed the sobriety tests, Officer Otto told him 
to call a friend or a taxi because he was not going to allow him to drive. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.11, Ls.5-9.) Mr. Worthington then walked back to the vehicle, got his dog, and 
then began walking down the street. (Prelim. Tr., p.11, Ls.10-12.) Officer Otto then 
called dispatch to have a unit respond to his location so he could advise them of what 
had just occurred. (Prelim. Tr., p.11, Ls.14-17.) As Officer Otto was leaving, he saw 
Mr. Worthington walking back his way but decided he was done dealing with the 
situation. (Prelim. Tr., p.12, Ls.12-22.) 
Officer James Baker, a Patrol Sergeant with the City of Jerome Police 
Department, arrived on the scene because he was dispatched there. (Prelim. Tr., p.16, 
Ls.15-17.) He was dispatched because, "there was a call that there was a person there 
that was intoxicated and was attempting to drive their vehicle." (Prelim. Tr., p.16, Ls.15-
17.) He had received a call "from one of my patrolmen by land line. He said there was 
a male subject that had been contacted by an off duty police officer. He was found to 
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be intoxicated and was told not to drive his automobile. I was given a description of the 
automobile and told where it was parked." (Prelim. Tr., p.,17 Ls.8-15.) He was given a 
description of the individual and was told that he had a dog in his possession. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.17, Ls.14-19.) When Officer Baker arrived, he "observed a person with that 
description in a car of that description leaving the area." (Prelim. Tr., p.17, Ls.20-22.) 
Officer Baker initiated a traffic stop; he asked Mr. Worthington if he was the 
individual approached by Officer Otto, and Mr. Worthington confirmed that he was that 
individual. (Prelim. Tr., p.20, Ls.18-22.) After seeing "obvious signs that he was 
intoxicated," Officer Baker placed Mr. Worthington under arrest for DUI. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.21, Ls.8-13.) Mr. Worthington was then transported to the Jerome County 
Sheriff's Department, where Officer Baker had him perform an lntoxilyzer test. (Prelim. 
Tr., p.21, Ls.18-21.) Mr. Worthington's test results were .29 and .28. (Prelim. Tr., p.22, 
Ls.2-4.) 
Counsel for Mr. Worthington argued that Mr. Worthington should not be bound 
over to district court: 
Well, Your Honor, in this case we have an off duty officer who had contact 
with the defendant. He relayed that information to dispatch. Somehow 
that information was relayed by an unidentified officer to Sergeant Baker, 
and it was the information that Sergeant Baker received from the 
unidentified officer, who somehow received the information from dispatch 
that was the probable cause to initiate the stop with Mr. Worthington, 
because Officer Baker testified there was no driving pattern. 
An officer can rely upon another officer's tip to institute a traffic stop. 
However, in this case I don't know if you can go to officers- to the arresting 
officer, especially when you don't have a reliable chain of who told who 
what. 
We do know that Officer Otto, from the Idaho State Police, made contact 
with Mr. Worthington, but I don't think it's been proven, for purposes of 
probable cause, how Mr. - how Officer Baker received that information. 
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So I think the state - before we even get to talking about whether or not 
he was too intoxicated to drive, I think we have an issue as to whether or 
not there was probable cause to initiate the stop in the first place. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.26, L.17 - p.27, L.18.) 
The magistrate bound the case over to district court, holding that the State met 
its burden of showing probable cause, and that the issue raised by Mr. Worthington's 
counsel "is really a motion to suppress in the sense that there was not probable cause 
for the stop, and that anything found subsequent to that would be suppressed." (Prelim. 
Tr., p.27, L.22 p.28, L.10.) 
Mr. Worthington filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.C. § 19-815A after being 
bound over to district court, asserting that "no probable cause existed for Officer Baker 
to initiate contact with the defendant." (R., p.50.) Mr. Worthington asked the court to 
"take notice of the preliminary hearing transcript in this matter and perform an 
independent review of the facts presented to the magistrate." (R., p.50.) Counsel for 
Mr. Worthington filed a supporting briefing, asserting, "[s]ince [Officer] Baker could not 
remember who the officer was that telephoned him, and he did not testify as to whether 
or not Otto was the officer that witnessed the events described to him by the second 
officer, at the time it was received this is an anonymous tip." (R., p.53.) 
Further, counsel asserted that the only information that Officer Baker possessed 
was that another peace officer telephoned a Jerome City Officer and stated that an 
intoxicated individual was at the Shell station and was seen in a green sedan, and, "this 
is of course two levels of hearsay." (R., p.53.) Finally, Mr. Worthington asserted, 
"[w]hen Baker initiated the stop he did not have any independent information which 
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corroborated the tip, other than he saw a green sedan leaving the Shell Station." 
(R., p.54.) 
The district court denied the motion based on the following analysis: 
The court understands that defendant's motion is based on [State v. 
Deccio, 136 Idaho 442 (Ct. App. 2001 )]. This deals with anonymous 
informants or tips. 
Clearly, the testimony of Trooper Otto is that he encountered the 
defendant at the Oasis, that Trooper Otto was off duty at that time. 
Trooper Otto suspected that the defendant was under the influence of 
alcohol, observed the defendant enter his vehicle. 
Trooper Otto then encountered the defendant. Contrary to the motion to 
dismiss, Trooper Otto did conduct certain FST's. For example, at page 11 
he stated that, 'I began my horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which 
Mr. Worthington failed, so I advised Mr. Worthington he was not okay to 
drive.' 
It was at that time that Mr. - or Trooper Otto thereafter then contacted 
dispatch. 
It is true that Officer Baker, at page 17 of the preliminary hearing, did 
testify that he was - initially had a dispatch call. He then received a call 
on a land line from another patrolman. 
Officer Baker was never asked to identify the name of the particular 
patrolman or the trooper, but the - Officer Baker did understand at the 
time that the information that was being received was from a patrolman, 
as well as an off duty law enforcement officer, which provided the 
description of the vehicle, description of the defendant, as well as the fact 
that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. 
The fact that Officer Baker did not observed an impaired driving behavior 
does not mean that there was not probable cause or a reasonable 
suspicion to stop the vehicle in view of the fact that Officer Baker did have 
credible and reliable information that the defendant was operating a motor 
vehicle under the influence of alcohol. So the court does not believe that 
the [Deccio] test or authority is applicable under the facts of this case and 
will deny the motion to dismiss. 
(Tr., p.14, L.8 - p.16, L.1.) After the district court denied the motion to dismiss, 
Mr. Worthington entered into a plea agreement whereby, he would enter conditional 
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guilty pleas to felony DUI and the persistent violator enhancement, and the State would 
recommend a 7 year sentence with 18 years indeterminate. (Tr., p.31, Ls.15-24.) 
Mr. Worthington preserved the right to appeal the "court's adverse ruling on [his] motion 
to dismiss." (Tr., p.42, Ls.1-2.) 
Following entry into this agreement, Mr. Worthington was appointed new 
counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw Mr. Worthington's guilty plea. (R., p.121.) 
Mr. Worthington filed a supporting affidavit, asserting that prior to the date he entered 
his plea, "my relationship with my attorney had deteriorated to such an extent that I no 
longer had faith in his representation, and could no longer effectively communicate with 
him." (R., p.124.) He averred, "while facing the start of the jury trial, I went ahead and 
entered a plea of guilty. With the lack of faith in my attorney, the inability to effectively 
communicate with my attorney, and with the jury trial about to commence, I entered my 
guilty plea without fully understanding the consequences thereof." (R., p.124.) No 
additional evidence was submitted at the hearing on this motion. (See Tr., p.66, L.7 -
p72, L.22.) The district court subsequently denied Mr. Worthington's motion. 
(R., p.131.) 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of twenty-five years, with five years 
fixed. (R., p.152.) Mr. Worthington appealed. (R., p.158.) He asserts that the district 
court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Worthington's motion to dismiss? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Worthington's Motion To Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Worthington asserts that the State lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
stop of his vehicle, and, therefore, the district court erred by denying his motion to 
dismiss. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact 
which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Worthington's Motion To Dismiss 
Mr. Worthington filed his motion to dismiss pursuant to I.C. § 19-815A. It 
provides, 
A defendant once held to answer to a criminal charge under this chapter 
may challenge the sufficiency of evidence educed at the preliminary 
examination by a motion to dismiss the commitment, signed by the 
magistrate, or the information filed by the prosecuting attorney. Such 
motion to dismiss shall be heard by a district judge. 
If the district judge finds that the magistrate has held the defendant to 
answer without reasonable or probable cause to believe that the 
defendant has committed the crime for which he was held to answer, or 
finds that no public offense has been committed, he shall dismiss the 
complaint, commitment or information and order the defendant 
discharged. 
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I.C. § 19-815A. While Mr. Worthington's motion cited the statute used to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing, in substance, 
Mr. Worthington's motion was a motion to suppress based upon the lack of probable 
cause for Officer Baker to conduct the traffic stop. The motion to dismiss, and the 
supporting brief, set forth the argument that, "[s]ince [Officer] Baker could not remember 
who the officer was that telephoned him, and he did not testify as to whether or not Otto 
was the officer that witnessed the events described to him by the second officer, at the 
time it was received this is an anonymous tip." (R., p.53.) Because, Mr. Worthington 
asserted, Officer Baker received an anonymous tip, the substance of the motion was a 
motion to suppress for lack of probable cause. 
Further, the district analyzed it as such, concluding that Deccio, supra, did not 
control and, "[t]he fact that Officer Baker did not observed an impaired driving behavior 
does not mean that there was not probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to stop the 
vehicle in view of the fat that Officer Baker did have credible and reliable information 
that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol." 
(Tr., p.15, Ls.17-23.) The district court clearly held that Officer Baker had a reasonable 
suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. 
In his motion to dismiss, Mr. Worthington relied exclusively on State v. Deccio, 
136 Idaho 442 (Ct. App. 2001). In Deccio, the Moscow police received an anonymous 
phone report from a female advising dispatch that Mr. Deccio was suicidal. Id. at 443. 
The woman refused to identify herself, stating only that she was the best friend of 
Mr. Deccio's wife, and she refused to give her address. Id. at 444. She stated that she 
was calling from a local bar and did not intend to stay there. Id. This woman stated that 
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Mr. Deccio was intoxicated, had a gun, and had intended to kill himself, but she did not 
report that she had actually observed any of the things she was calling to report. Id. 
She stated that Mr. Deccio was heading to a casino in Lewiston and that he drove a 
white Subaru. Id. 
The Moscow police dispatcher notified the Latah County sheriff's office, and an 
officer spotted a vehicle matching this description. Id. The officer eventually stopped 
the vehicle and smelled an odor of alcohol on Mr. Deccio. Id. He was arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. 
The magistrate granted Mr. Deccio's motion to suppress and the district court 
affirmed. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded, "the magistrate held that the anonymous 
tip, standing alone, did not bear sufficient indicia of reliability justifying the stop of 
Deccio's vehicle. We have been shown no error in the magistrate's determination." Id. 
at 445. 
In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held 
that a dispatcher's report may be based upon a variety of sources, ranging from another 
officer to a completely anonymous telephone tip. The Supreme Court reasoned that 
although an anonymous tip, standing alone, is generally not sufficient, it may contribute 
to the necessary reasonable suspicion when coupled with the officer's own 
corroboration of significant details of the tip. Id. at 326. Further, the information from an 
anonymous tip may provide justification for a stop when the information it contains 
bears sufficient indicia of reliability or when significant aspects of the tip are sufficiently 
corroborated by independent police observation. State v. Hankey, 134 Idaho 844, 847 
(2000). 
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In the instant case, Mr. Worthington asserted that 
in this case we have an off duty officer who had contact with the 
defendant. He relayed that information to dispatch. Somehow that 
information was relayed by an unidentified officer to Sergeant Baker, and 
it was the information that Sergeant Baker received from the unidentified 
officer, who somehow received the information from dispatch that was the 
probable cause to initiate the stop with Mr. Worthington, because Officer 
Baker testified there was no driving pattern. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.26, Ls.17-25.) Because Sergeant Baker did not identify this officer, 
Mr. Worthington reasoned, the district court should have treated the tip as anonymous 
and dismissed the case pursuant to Deccio. Counsel argued, "[s]ince [Officer] Baker 
could not remember who the officer was that telephoned him, and he did not testify as 
to whether or not Otto was the officer that witnessed the events described to him by the 
second officer, at the time it was received this is an anonymous tip." (R., p.53.) 
Officer Baker testified that he was dispatched because, "there was a call that 
there was a person there that was intoxicated and was attempting to drive their vehicle." 
(Prelim. Tr., p.16, Ls.15-17 .) He had received a call "from one of my patrolmen by land 
line. He said there was a male subject that had been contacted by an off duty police 
officer. He was found to be intoxicated and was told not to drive his automobile. I was 
given a description of the automobile and told where it was parked." (Prelim. Tr., p., 17 
Ls.8-15.) He was given a description of the individual and was told that he had a dog in 
his possession. (Prelim. Tr., p.17, Ls.14-19.) When Officer Baker arrived, he "observed 
a person with that description in a car of that description leaving the area." (Prelim. 
Tr., p.17, Ls.20-22.) 
Mr. Worthington acknowledges that Officer Otto was the source of the tip and 
relayed the information to dispatch. Mindful of this fact, he asserts that the district court 
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should have treated this as an anonymous tip case because Sergeant Baker did not 
identify the patrolman from whom he received the information, and there is no indication 
where the patrolman received the information. 
Further, Mr. Worthington submits that the tip was not sufficiently corroborated to 
justify the stop. While Sergeant Baker testified that he observed a person and a vehicle 
matching the tip's description, he did not testify that he witnessed any impaired driving 
which would corroborate the allegation that Mr. Worthington had been driving. 
Considering both of these factors, Mr. Worthington submits that Sergeant Baker lacked 
reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop of Mr. Worthington's vehicle and that 
the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Worthington respectfully requests that the district court's order denying his 
motion to dismiss be reversed and that his case be remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 29th day of November, 2011. 
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